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Not outside the scope of reasonable inference is the possibility that the
Court may have intentionally disregarded the question of privity of estate
between covenantor and covenantee. Thus, it may have simply indicated by
omission, that the test in future cases will be as stated as a continuous
succession of conveyances between the original covenantor and the party now
sought to be burdened. If this is so, then it would appear that the type of
privity required has been changed. Rather than requiring privity between the
originally covenanting parties, the New York courts will require that privity
of estate which normally flows from the conveyance of land by grantor to
grantee.
This apparent change of the privity requirement seems desirable and is
in accord with the view of a leading modern authority in this area.1 4 Clark
states that the requirement of privity is designed to furnish a connecting link
-between the parties.' 5 Since that is present because of the promise between
the covenantor and covenantee, the only remaining need is to justify the transfer
of the right or duty created by the promise. This is accomplished by requiring
a continuous succession of conveyances between the original covenantor and
the party now sought to be burdened. Previously, by requiring privity of estate
between the covenantor and covenantee, there arose the need for a conveyance
between the two parties. Professor Clark argues that a conveyance from
the covenantor to the covenantee, and then back, would fulfill the formality of
this privity requirement.16 Although the New York courts are concerned with
undue restrictions on the alienation of land, .the privity requirement as previ-
ously formulated has no real effect, either to hinder or facilitate alienability.
This is so because, as previously indicated, a barren formality will suffice to
create privity of estate between covenantor and covenantee.
This decision seemingly eliminates the last vestiges of the requirement
of privity of estate between covenantor and covenantee still apparent in the
Neponsit case. If so, this case may herald future decisions in which the New
York courts will be concerned with the "intent and substantive effect of the
covenant, rather than its form."'1 In determining when a covenant may run
with the land, the courts will be free to ignore at least one formalistic and
technical question, i.e., is there privity of estate between the covenantor and
covenantee. They may instead regard the actual burden the covenant places
on the land, in terms of the financial burden it may seek to impose, and its
duration in time'l 8
DEsTRuc'~rmn.i oE EASEMENTS IMPLIED IN GRANT
"An easement . . . is an interest in land existing independent of the fee
14. Clark, Covenants and Interests Running With the Land 117 (2d ed. 1947).
1M. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Supra note 3 at 259, 15 NXE.2d 797 (1938).
18. Supra note 2.
COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
of the land over which it is exercised, and is an estate in land possessed in fee,
by the owner of the dominant estate." 19 The Court in the Nellis case held that
an express easement in grant is capable of being a fee, or freehold estate within
the meaning of Section 243 of the New York Real Property Law, requiring
acknowledgment of fees or freehold estates. It follows, therefore, that ease-
ments, "... whether arising through express or implied grant, are as inde-
structible, in their nature, . . . as is the estate which is the subject of the
grant."'  (emphasis supplied).
When an easement by grant, express or implied, is compared with an ease-
ment by necessity, the most striking difference is that the latter is not a per-
petual right, but is subject to termination at such time as the necessity no
longer exists.21
In the principal case of Gerbig v. ZUmpano,222 the parties were owners
of adjacent lots separated by a lane, hereinafter called lot 166. The lots were
formerly portions of an entire tract which had been divided into numbered
lots and lanes on a map filed with the appropriate authority. The defendant
acquired his property by a deed making reference to this map. Originally lot
166 formed part of a lane which was the only means of access to the defendant's
lot. In 1912, however, an avenue was opened which bordered the defendant's
property thus making unnecessary the use of lot 166 as a means of access.
Upon acquiring title to lot 166, plaintiff instituted this action to extinguish
defendant's claimed easement and for the removal of incumbrances erected
by the defendant. The trial court held in favor of plaintiff,2 3 and the defendant
appealed. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed,2 4 and on appeal the
Court of Appeals unanimously reversed and a new trial was ordered on the
issue of abandonment which was raised for the first time.
The Court of Appeals held that this was an easement implied in grant
and could only be extinguished by abandonment, conveyance, condemnation,
or adverse possession. The Court relied on Holloway v. So-uttmayd,2 a case
involving an action in ejectment by the- original grantor to establish his rights
in a roadbed which had been discontinued as a public highway. The deed to
the grantee made reference to a highway in describing the location of the
property (as the deed in the principal case made reference to the map) and
on the basis of that reference it was held that the grantor retained the fee
subject to the grantee's easement which was perpetual. The Holloway case
in turn relied on White's Bank v. Nickols, which stated the general rule that
"When land is granted bounded on a street or highway there is an implied
19. Nellis v. Munson, 108 N.Y. 453, 460, 15 N.E. 739, 741 (1888).
20. Johnson and Co. v. Cox, 196 N.Y. 110, 122, 89 N.E. 454, 458 (1909).
21. Kux v. Chandler, - Misc. -, 112 N.Y.S.2d 141 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
22. 7 N.Y.2d 327, 197 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1960).
23. 13 Misc. 2d 357, 177 N.Y.S.2d 969 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
24. 7 A.D.2d 904, 182 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (1st Dep't 1959).
25. 139 N.Y. 390, 34 N.E. 1047 (1893).
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covenant that there is such a way, that so far as the grantee is concerned it
shall be continued, and that the grantee, his heirs and assigns shall have the
benefit of it."-6
In Johnson and Co. v. Cox,27 also relied on in the present case, the plaintiff
took by deed making reference to an existing road, the fee of which was in the
grantor. The defendant was an adjacent owner and was attempting to fence in
the roadbed which had been abandoned as a public highway. There was a
proposed new road which would border the plaintiff's property but it had not
been actually opened. Additional facts indicated the abandoned road was the
only means of an easterly access to his land and absolutely necessary to the
continuance of his business. Expressly disregarding the apparent necessity, the
Court, basing its decision on the fact that the deed made reference to the road,
said, "It would seem to go without saying that an easement by grant is not
to be distinguished from a deed conveying the fee, and can only be acquired
by condemnation or conveyance." 28 Thus, an easement, implied in grant on the
basis that the deed made reference to a roadbed, the fee of which was in the
grantor, is afforded the same perpetual life as an express easement by grant.
. The trial court, relying mainly on a Cardozo opinion,m in essence held
that when the necessity giving rise to the implication is gone the easement
ceases. However, Cardozo expressly excluded subdivision cases, which are
a ramification of the cases discussed above, i.e., easements implied in grant
because the deed made reference to an existing or proposed road or lane as in
the existing case.m°
Although the principal case neither adds nor subtracts from the existing
law in this area, it does suggest that perhaps the best way to deal with ease-
ments implied in grant is to base them on necessity. Applying the rule of
easements by necessity to the facts in the Johnson case, the result would be
that the plaintiff would be assured the use of the roadbed while necessary and
that the owner would be assured the beneficial use of his land in the future
when the necessity ceases, as opposed to the result obtained, namely, that
the owner was permanently enjoined from obstructing the roadbed even if the
road is never used. Likewise, in the principal case the plaintiff would have the
unobstructed use of his land free from an easement which was no longer neces-
sary to the defendant's full enjoyment of his estate. Although the result of
the trial court is legally in error, practically, it is not difficult to defend.
26. 64 N.Y. 65, 73 (1876).
27. Supra note 20.
28. Id. at 121, 89 N.E. 458.
29. Matter of City of New York (Northern Blvd.), 258 N.Y. 136, 179 N.E. 321(1932).
30. See Lord v. Alkins, 138 N.Y. 184, 33 N.E. 1035 (1893); Fiebelkorn v. Rogacki,
280 App. Div. 20, 111 N.YS.2d 898 (4th Dep't 1952), aff'd 305 N.Y. 725, 112 N.E.2d 13(1953).
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REPLEviN AcTION: MEASU-RE OF DAMAGES
The law affords two possible measures of damages in a replevin action.
The measure of damages applied in a particular case depends on the purpose
for which the plaintiff held the chattel. The first measure of damages applies
to merchandise held for sale or consumption and gives the plaintiff interest on
the value from the time of taking, plus the difference in value at the time of
taking and the value at the time of the action if the value of the chattel has
depreciated. The second measure of damages applies to chattels held for use
and indemnifies the owner for the value of the lost use.31
In the case of Michalowski v. Ey,3 2 plaintiffs automobile was impounded
by the defendant, Property Custodian of Nassau County, on the suspicion
that it was stolen property. Previously, the Court of Appeals had held that
the plaintiff was entitled to recover possession of his car plus damages for its
wrongful detention. 33 Plaintiff instituted the present action to recover these
damages. The trial court found that the car was held by plaintiff for his use
and not for sale. Normally, the measure of damages applicable would be the
value of the lost use. However, since the parties stipulated only as to the loss
of value, introducing no evidence whatever as to the value of the lost use,
the Court deemed them to have abandoned the measure of damages for chattels
held for use and to have agreed that the measure of damages applicable to
chattels held for sale should be applied.
Although the background of this particular case appears to justify the
manner in which it was settled,34 it is unusual for a court to allow litigants
to apply a technically incorrect rule of damages. Perhaps the Court reasoned
that the burden of demanding and proving the maximum amount of damages
fell on the plaintiff and accepted the stipulations of the parties as to the
value involved, in the absence of other evidence.3 5
The provision of Section 479 of the Civil Practice Act that any relief
consistent with the issues may be granted after an answer is interposed has not
been construed to allow a money judgement in excess of the amount demanded
in the complaint. 3 6 Therefore, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate
Division's modification of the judgment to conform to the amount demanded
in the complaint.37
31. Allen v. Fox, 51 N.Y. 562 (1873).
32. 7 N.Y.2d 71, 195 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1959).
33. Michalowski v. Ey, 4 N.Y.2d 277, 174 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1958).
34. Plaintiff was in jail during a considerable portion of the time car was held. Case
was previously before the Court of Appeals.
35. Hunt Aylmer Corp. v. Landy, 241 App. Div. 682, 269 N.Y. Supp. 465 (2d Dep't
1934).
36. Coming v. Coming, 6 N.Y. 97 (1849); Barbato v. Vollmer, 273 App. Div. 169,
76 N.Y.S.2d 528 (3d Dep't 1948).
37. 8 A.D.2d 854, 190 N.Y.S.2d 535 (2d Dep't 1959).
